Using intraday data, we study spillovers from European stock markets to the U.S. in the hours before the flash crash on 6 May 2010. Many commentators have pointed to negative market sentiment and high volatility during the European trading session before the Flash Crash. However, based on a range of vector autoregressive models, we find no robust evidence that spillovers increased at that time. On the contrary, spillovers on 6 May were mostly smaller than in the preceding days, during which there was great uncertainty surrounding the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The absence of evidence for spillovers underscores the difficulties in understanding the nature of flash events in financial markets.
Introduction
The 2010 U.S. Flash Crash served as a sharp reminder of the potential fragility of the international financial system. On 6 May 2010, around 2:30 in the afternoon, U.S. equity markets started showing extraordinary large declines.
1 Within minutes, the Dow Jones had lost more than 6% of its value. For some individual securities, the declines were even stronger, with some trades being executed at prices as low as a penny. It was only after a brief trading halt at 2:45 p.m. that financial markets recovered (CFTC-SEC, 2010) . The Flash Crash also had large international repercussions. In Canada, the equity index declined by more than 3% (IIROC, 2010) .
On Latin American equity exchanges, prices of individual stocks declined by up to 10% (Jansen, 2018) . The importance of understanding why this crash occurred was further underlined by a number of subsequent flash events. For instance, U.S. tified the activation of a sell algorithm for E-Mini contracts -index futures contracts based on the S&P 500 -as the immediate trigger for the crash (CFTC-SEC, 2010) . From the E-Mini market, the crash then spilled over to the rest of the U.S.
financial system (see, e.g., Madhavan (2011) , Kirilenko et al. (2017), or Menkveld and Yueshen (2017) ). Also, some papers have pointed to adverse developments in order flow dynamics in the days before the crash O'Hara, 2011, 2012) . 2 Furthermore, U.S. authorities prosecuted a London-based trader who, in 2016, pleaded guilty to repeated attempts of trying to manipulate the market for E-Mini contracts (Department of Justice, 2016) .
This paper contributes to the literature on the origins of the flash events by studying the possible role of spillovers from Europe to the U.S. in the hours before the 2010 Flash Crash. As observers already noted at the time, the European trading session on 6 May had been an extremely nervous one.
3 First and foremost, financial markets were closely following social and political developments in Greece, where the lingering sovereign debt crisis was reaching a crucial stage. On 2 May, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union had reached an agreement with the Greek government on a e110 billion financial support package. However, this agreement required Greece to make rigorous adjustments to its government finances.
4
These adjustments, such as reductions in government wages and pensions, had led to severe social unrest. On 6 May, the Greek parliament was scheduled to debate the fiscal adjustment measures, with a crucial vote being expected sometime during the evening in Greece. That same day, there would also be fierce debates in the German parliament, which was divided regarding Germany's sizeable contribution to the financial support package.
A second reason why European markets were nervous was a growing fear of contagion from the Greek sovereign debt crisis to the rest of Europe. Primarily, markets worried about high levels of government debt in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and
Ireland. Spreads on credit default swaps for these countries' government debt had been widening considerably. In addition, markets were nervous about the strength of banking sectors in these countries, given the large exposures to their home coun- 3 These descriptive paragraphs build on CFTC-SEC (2010) and news reports by CNN (Twin, 2010) , the Financial Times, (Nolan, 2010) , the Guardian (Roberts, 2010) , the New York Times (Bowley, 2010) , and the Wall Street Journal (Lauricella and McKay, 2010 Brown's Labour Party and the Conservatives led by David Cameron. In the end, neither party was able to win an absolute majority. Throughout the day, however, the market reaction to election news was muted, and dynamics in U.K. equity prices were primarily driven by news on the sovereign debt crisis.
Given the intense news flow and the predominantly negative sentiment in the European trading session, there is good reason to study spillovers from Europe to the U.S. in the hours before the Flash Crash. To do so, this paper uses the approach proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) . Their idea is to start by estimating vector autoregressive models, before subsequently running forecast-error variance decompositions to measure spillovers. Such an approach is especially useful when the key issue is not necessarily to determine whether any spillovers are due to interdependence or contagion (cf. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) . To estimate spillovers, this paper uses minute-by-minute data on stock market indices in Europe and the U.S.
In terms of research design, the paper compares intraday spillovers, both for returns and volatility, on 6 May with those during the preceding two weeks of market trading. These intraday spillovers can be estimated by making use of the two-hour time window during which U.S. and European trading hours overlap each business day.
This paper concludes that spillovers from European stock markets to the U.S.
did not increase in the hours before the 2010 Flash Crash. During the two-hour time window on 6 May where European and U.S. trading overlapped, spillovers to the U.S. were at levels comparable to, or lower than, those in the preceding two weeks of stock-market trading. This conclusion holds for return as well as volatility spillovers, and it is robust across a range of VAR models that were considered to capture various dynamics in the news flow in Europe on 6 May. Overall, these findings underscore the difficulties in understanding the nature of flash events in financial markets. Though perhaps intuitively appealing, a narrative based on spillovers from the European debt crisis seems to offer little guidance for a deeper understanding of the flash events in financial markets.
Research Design
To study spillovers, this paper uses the approach proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) . The literature has since long studied how shocks can spill over via international financial markets. Various approaches are available, for instance the analysis of cross-market correlations (King and Wadhwani, 1990) , the use of (G)ARCH frameworks (Lin et al., 1994) , and the study of factor models (Bekaert et al., 2014) . In many types of analysis, an important question is whether any evidence for spillovers should be attributed to interdependence or contagion. As first stressed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , contagion only occurs when reactions to shocks are in excess of normal cross-market comovements. For the present paper, however, this distinction between interdependence and contagion is less important. Merely, the aim is to see whether shocks in European markets had a greater effect on U.S. shares are relevant. These shares measure the contribution to the n-step ahead forecast-error variance in forecasting x i due to shocks in x j , where i = j (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2010) . The total spillover is the sum of all cross-variance shares. This sum of cross-variance shares is then scaled by the sum of relative contributions to the forecast-error variance. This scaling results in an index that lies between 0 and 100, where 100 would indicate that the forecast-error variance is completely due to cross-variance shares, i.e. spillovers.
At this point, it is important to note that the empirical results of this paper will not center on the standard Diebold-Yilmaz indicator, i.e. the sum of all crossvariance shares divided by the number of variables (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2010) .
Rather, this paper focuses on a specific sub-set of the cross-variance shares, namely those that measure the contribution of innovations in European returns to the forecast-error variance of U.S. returns. This measure, which also ranges between 0 and 100, is more directly suited for answering the main research question of this paper, namely whether spillovers from Europe were larger in the hours before the Flash Crash. For comparison, however, an extension in Section 5 will discuss results for standard Diebold-Yilmaz indices using all cross-variance shares.
The estimations in this paper use minute-by-minute data for stock market in- For any of the nine days in the sample, we can thus estimate a VAR model using 120 minute-by-minute observations. Using these VAR models, we can then calculate the level of spillovers between Europe and the U.S. on any particular trading day.
To put dynamics on the day of the Flash Crash in perspective, we can compare the level of spillovers during the last two hours of the European trading session on 6
May to the levels during this time slot on each of the preceding eight business days in the sample.
The analysis is, admittedly, subject to a number of caveats. The most fundamental caveat is that the period with simultaneous trading on 6 May does not include the Flash Crash episode itself. As European equity markets had all closed at 11:30, there is a three-hour gap separating the analysis of this paper from the start of the Flash-Crash episode. Any potential evidence of spillovers should, therefore, not necessarily be seen as evidence for a causal chain of events. However, a larger degree of spillovers on the morning of 6 May would corroborate the notion that negative sentiment from Europe contributed to a market environment in which a flash event could materialise.
Second, it should be remembered that the daily VAR models rely on, at most, a two-hour window. Therefore, 120 minute-by-minute observations are available per trading day, which only leaves sufficient degrees of freedom when the number of lags p and the number of endogenous variables k remain sufficiently small. This means the sample with overlap in trading on that day only starts at 10:00 instead of 9:30. We address these two data challenges by never including both Greece and Portugal in the same VAR model. This paper estimates VAR models for seven distinct combinations of countries.
All of the VAR models include, of course, U.S. data. The models differ, however, in their use of European market data. Firstly, by varying the set of countries in the model, we take into account the various dimensions of the news flow in Europe on 6 May. Secondly, using different sets of countries helps in addressing, as much as possible, the data gaps for Greece and Portugal. For all VAR models, rather than showing the Diebold-Yilmaz (2009) spillover index itself, the paper reports the contributions of European cross-variance shares to the forecast errors for the U.S. stock market. This measure gives the most direct answer to the research question.
We start with four models that focus on the separate elements of news flow on 6 May 2010. The first model is a bivariate VAR that uses stock index returns (or volatility) for the U.S. and Greece. In terms of news flow, this model focuses on the key element driving market sentiment on 6 May, namely the debate in the Greek parliament on the EU-IMF financial assistance package. However, in terms of data, this model relies on the smallest number of observations. A second VAR model focuses on the possible contagion to other highly-indebted economies by estimating a system that includes data for the U.S., Spain, Italy, and Portugal. The third model is a bivariate VAR that uses data for the U.S. and Germany. Being the largest euro area economy, using Germany proxies for reactions to the ECB monetary-policy decision on 6 May. It also directly captures potential reactions to the debates in the German parliament on 6 May. A fourth model is a VAR system for the U.S. and the U.K. This model captures market reactions to the U.K. general election and worries about contagion of the sovereign debt crisis to the U.K. banking sector.
The remaining three models combine the four elements of the news flow on 6 May. First, we estimate a VAR model that includes two Southern-European economies (namely Spain and Italy), the U.K., and Germany. In two subsequent models, we add data for either Portugal or Greece, in light of the data gaps for these two countries. In terms of factorisation for the Cholesky decomposition, the U.S. is always placed first, followed by, respectively, the U.K., Germany, and the Southern-European countries. Section 5 will show that the Cholesky ordering does not fundamentally change the conclusions on spillovers from Europe to the U.S.
Descriptives
We start by charting equity-market dynamics in Europe on 6 May. To that end, Turning to summary statistics, In Greece, squared returns averaged 0.015%. In Spain and Italy, the averages for squared returns were, respectively, 0.012% and 0.009%.
insert Table 1 Figure 2 , the spillovers from Europe on 6 May are never more than 5%. In fact, for three of the four models, the spillover index on that day is less than 1%. In other words, according to these estimates, around 99% of the forecast error variance for U.S. returns came from the U.S. The spillovers on 6 May were mostly comparable to or, in some cases, smaller than those on the preceding three trading days.
The degree of spillovers in the week of the Flash Crash was, in fact, comparatively limited. This point follows from comparing the left part of the two panels in Figure   2 , which report results for the trading week of 26 April, with the right-hand side of each panel. In both weeks, spillovers from Europe to the U.S. were small, as less than 10% of the forecast-error variance came from innovations in European returns.
However, in the week preceding the Flash Crash, spillovers were distinctly larger. The three VAR models that combine news-flow elements also indicate no increase in spillovers on 6 May. Figure 3 reports the results. The patterns across the two trading weeks generally echo those reported in Figure 2 . Firstly, spillovers were higher in the week of 26 April compared to the week after the agreement between the Greek government and the IMF and EU. Second, spillovers were high on 28
April and 30th April, ranging between 30% on the latter and 50% on the former day. Third, there is no clear increase in spillovers in the hours before the crash on 6
May. In fact, based on these three VAR models, the level of spillovers on that day is the lowest of the nine daily estimates in this sample period. 
Robustness and extension
This section starts with discussing two robustness checks concerning the specification of the vector autoregressive models. An extension discusses Diebold-Yilmaz (2009) indices based on all cross-variance shares. permutations. In these alternative specifications, spillovers now reach levels of 20% -25%.
Turning to volatility, there are again no clear indications that spillovers on 6
May were exceptional, although these spillovers are no longer always estimated to have been lower than during the preceding few trading days ( Figure 6, panel B) .
Spillovers according to the baseline model are among the lowest of the 24 possible models. In particular during the trading week of 26 April, volatility spillovers now often reach levels of 50% -60%. Most alternative models confirm the relatively high levels of spillovers indicated by the baseline model for 27 and 30 April. For the trading week of 3 May, there is some heterogeneity across models. There are a few variants suggesting that spillovers increased from around 20% to 50% in that week, but these latter levels are still comparable to those seen for the preceding trading week.
For decompositions that do not order the U.S. first, we generally find that spillovers on 6 May were comparable to those in the preceding days. The two box plots in Figure 7 show distributions for the 96 different orderings, where the boxes indicate the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile. The diamonds indicate sample means, and the dark circles show outliers. Starting with returns, the average levels of spillovers (Panel A) are generally higher than those reported in Figure 6 . Given the different positioning of the U.S. in these decompositions, this finding is not surprising. On average, daily return spillovers range between 70%
(for 27 April) and 85% (for 28 April). Average spillovers for 6 May lie towards the top end of this range, but it should also be noted that there are several orderings (as indicated by the outliers) where the spillovers are only between 55% and 65%. For volatility, spillovers for 6 May are around 80% on average, which is a level comparable to that on 5 May and 30 April.
Second, we show that the baseline findings are robust to using richer lag specifications. Given that we can use, at most, 120 observations, the focus is on bivariate models, as otherwise the number of estimated parameters would become too large.
We focus on five models that always include the U.S. and then add data from either the U.K., Germany, Spain, Italy, or Greece. For these bivariate models, we consider specifications with lag lengths of up to 5 and 10 minutes. Figure 8 reports the results, once again measured as the contribution of European shocks to the forecasterror variance for the U.S. The two top panels focus on return spillovers, while the bottom panels focus on volatility spillovers.
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The main insight from Figure 8 is, once again, that spillovers on 6 May were not exceptionally large. In most cases, spillovers were again larger in the week preceding the Flash Crash. Having said that, the bivariate models for U.S. and Greece are an important exception to this latter point. Return spillovers and volatility spillovers now increase during the trading week of 3 May. This finding contrast the baseline findings in Figure 3 and 4. Overall, though, spillovers on 6 May are still estimated to have been lower compared to, say, those on 28 April (Figure 8 , top left panel) or 29 April (bottom two panels).
An extension reports Diebold-Yilmaz (2009) spillover indices that use all crossvariance shares. Figure 9 reports these indices for three of the seven baseline models.
Panel A focuses on returns, and panel B reports spillovers for volatility. 9 Again, we conclude that spillovers on 6 May were not exceptionally large. For instance, for the model that includes the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Spain, and Italy, return spillovers are constant around a level of 60% during the sample period ( Figure 9 , panel A).
The exception is the bivariate model for the U.S. and Greece, where the spillovers do increase to a level of around 15% in the course of the trading week of 3 May. For volatility spillovers, such an upward trend is not observed.
insert Figure 9 here
Conclusions
This paper finds no clear indications that spillovers from Europe contributed to the 2010 Flash Crash in the U.S. financial system. Most importantly, we find no robust evidence that equity-market spillovers were larger during the two-hour time window on 6 May when European and U.S. stock-market trading overlapped. On the contrary, both return spillovers and volatility spillovers were at levels comparable to, or much lower than, those in the preceding few trading days. This finding is based on the Diebold-Yilmaz (2009) approach that uses vector autoregressive models to measure spillovers. The conclusion is robust across a range of VAR models that capture various elements of the news flow in Europe on 6 May.
When contrasted with the tumultuous news flow stemming from Europe on 6
May 2010, this paper's main conclusion may come as a surprise. At the time,
9 Results for the additional five models lead to similar conclusions; results available upon request.
it was widely noted that the European trading session was a nervous one, and the intraday stock-market data discussed in this paper indeed corroborates the view that sentiment was negative, especially on Southern-European equity markets. However, this paper helps putting the events of 6 May in perspective. The trading session may have been a nervous one, but to some extent nerves of market participants seemed to have calmed compared to the preceding days. Two elements seem relevant here.
First, markets seem to have taken some reassurance from the agreement on financial assistance between the Greek government, the EU, and the IMF. Secondly, on 6
May itself, it became increasingly clear that the Greek parliament would support this agreement, and in the end, Greek stock markets did not post large losses on that day. If spillovers from Europe could have contributed to the materialization of flash events, it is perhaps more surprising that this did not already occur on any of the preceding few trading days, when the levels of spillovers to the U.S. were much higher. This paper's results further underscore the difficulties in understanding the nature of flash events in financial markets. Very few, if any, commentators have actually argued that negative sentiment surrounding the Greek debt crisis in itself caused the Flash Crash. However, pointing to the high levels of volatility in European markets on 6 May has been an often-used narrative to, at the very least, provide some intuition for the occurrence of this major flash event. This paper suggests that this particular narrative should offer little guidance in future discussions on flash events.
As an alternative, it seems more promising to keep studying the role of microstructural factors, such as liquidity (Noss et al., 2017) , order flow (Easley et al., 2011), or high-frequency trading (Kirilenko et al., 2017) . 
